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C OMMUNICATIONS SERVICES to aircraft have traditionally
been provided through ground-based technologies involv-
ing the use of High Frequency (HF), Ultra High Frequency
(UHF), and Very High Frequency (VHF), radio waves. The HF
system is used for long-distance communications between air-
craft in flight and ground stations. Traditional long-range and
some medium-range aircraft are equipped with a dual HF sys-
tem including an antenna common to both transmitters, while
short range aircraft may be equipped with a single UHF system
(including an antenna) and may not be equipped with any HF
systems. The VHF part of the electromagnetic spectrum is de-
fined as the range of frequencies between 30 and 300 MHz.1
Within this range, the band from 118 MHz to 138 MHz is dedi-
cated to aeronautical mobile communications applications.2 At
these low-frequency ranges, the amount of bandwidth available
is limited, which causes the use of these frequencies to deliver
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very low data rates.' These frequencies are also severely im-
pacted by the ionosphere, which can "twist, bend, attenuate, and
reflect these wavelengths."4Communications systems using
VHF/UHF must allow for significant fading and other disrup-
tion of the transmission, often on a random basis.5 This situa-
tion is more pronounced in the tropics around the geomagnetic
equator, particularly during the spring and fall equinoxes 6.
Technical constraints arising from the use of HF and UHF/VHF
frequencies catalyzed the evolution towards the use of other mi-
crowave applications involving communications between Aero-
nautical Earth Stations7 (AES) mounted on aircraft frames and
satellites, in radio frequencies above 1 GHz.s
At the 10th Air Navigation Conference held under the aus-
pices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in
Montreal on September 5-20, 1991, the conference considered
Agenda Item 2: Consideration of the Future Air Navigation Sys-
tems (FANS) concept for the future air navigation system, and
its capability of correcting the shortcomings of the present Com-
munications, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS) system.' The
conference was presented with an overview of the FANS concept
for the future air navigation system.10 The shortcomings of the
existent air navigation system were discussed and a Communica-
tion, Navigation, and Surveillance and Air Traffic Management
(CNS/ATM) concept for FANS was proposed." The shortcom-
3 Id.
4 Id. at 30.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Mobile earth stations are defined as "earth station[s] in the mobile satellite
service intended to be used while in motion or during halts at unspecified
points." See ITU RADIo REGULATIONS 66. Whilst the term "Station" refers to "one
or more transmitters or receivers or a combination of transmitters and receivers,
including the accessory equipment, necessary at one location for carrying on a
radiocommunication service" an "Earth Station" may be located either on the
Earth's surface or within the major portion of the Earth's atmosphere. (See ITU
RADIO REGULATIONS 58, 60).
8 For a description of the shortcomings arising from the use of VHF/UHF
radio waves, see Michael Milde, Legal Aspects of Future Air Navigation Systems, XII
ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 87 (1987); WERNER GULDIMANN & STEPHAN KAISER,
FUTURE AIR NAVIGATION SYSTEMS - LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS, 15-16
(1993); W. STOFFEL , LEGAL ASPECTS OF AERONAUTICAL MOBILE SATELLITE SER-
VICES - THE ICAO FANS CONCEPT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 36TH COLLOQUIUM OF
THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SPACE LAw, 16 (Graz 1993).
9 ICAO Doc. 9583, AN-Conf/10/1991.
10 GULDIMAN & KAISER, supra note 8, at 78.
11 Id. at 81.
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ings that had been identified by the FANS Committee were
stated in Appendix A to the report on Agenda Item 2.12 The
report also pointed out that most of the aforementioned limita-
tions were intrinsic to the systems themselves, and that although
the effects are not the same for every part of the world, it is
evident that one or more of several factors inhibit the further
development of air navigation almost everywhere. 13 Therefore
new CNS systems should surmount these limitations to become
more responsive to users' needs. 14 Thus, the new CNS systems
should provide, inter alia: (a) global communications, naviga-
tion, and surveillance coverage from very low to very high alti-
tudes, also embracing remote, off-shore and oceanic areas; and
(b) digital data interchange between air-ground systems to fully
exploit the automated capabilities of both. ' 15 The FANS Com-
mittees concluded that the exploitation of satellite technology
appeared to be the only viable solution to overcome the short-
comings of the existent CNS system and also fulfill the global
needs and requirements of the foreseeable future.16 Conse-
quently, the Committee developed "an overall long-term projec-
tion for the coordinated evolutionary development of air
navigation for international civil aviation over a period of the
order of twenty five years," in which complementary to certain
terrestrial systems, satellite-based CNS systems would be the key
to worldwide improvements. 7
The main features of the communications aspect of the CNS
system, set forth in the Appendix to the Report on Agenda Item
2, to be implemented over a period of twenty-five years, pre-
dicted that satellite data and voice communications will eventu-
ally be available for at least the larger part of the world. Initially
HF may have to be maintained over polar regions until such
time as satellite communication is available. In the future, aero-
nautical mobile communication would extensively use digital
modulation techniques to permit high efficiency information
flow, optimum use of automation both in aircraft and on the
ground, and economical frequency spectrum utilization."i Ex-
12 Id. at 81-82. See also B.D.K. Henaku, The Law on Global Navigation by Satellite, 1
AST L. MONOGRAPHS 72 (1998)




17 Id. at 83.
18 Id.
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cept in high-density areas within the coverage of terrestrial-
based systems, aeronautical mobile satellite communications ser-
vices (data and voice) would use satellite-relay, operating in the
frequency bands allocated to the Aeronautical Mobile Satellite
Services (AMSS), while terrestrial based air-to-ground communi-
cations would continue to serve in terminal areas and in other
high-density airspace.
The AMSS offers digital voice and data services using geosta-
tionary satellites and is provided in the mobile satellite service
bands 1,545 MHz - 1,555 MHz and 1,646.5 - 1,656.5 MHz. 9
Within the broad scope of satellite communications to and from
aircraft, four types of aeronautical communications could be
conducted, as identified by ICAO. These include: air traffic
service, aeronautical operational control, aeronautical adminis-
trative communications, and aeronautical public correspon-
dence. 21 Satellite Aeronautical Public Correspondence (S-APC),
the focus of this article, is the most recent development in aero-
nautical communication. S-APC consists primarily of connec-
tions of onboard facilities with existing fixed networks (e.g.
domestic telephone networks), in addition to means for permit-
ting the switching of connections to other aeronautical passen-
ger facilities (via a ground station) 21 to enable personal
communications by passengers and crew. Approximately 3,000
aircraft have been equipped with satellite communications sys-
tems.22 The majority have been configured for S-APC.23 Both the
INMARSAT commercial global satellite system as well as the re-
cently launched Connexion-by-Boeing service support AMSS.
S-APC in its simplest form, conducted within a mobile satellite
communications network, follows distinct calling procedures de-
pending on whether the call is made from air-to-ground, or
ground-to-air. In case of the former, and with regards to passen-
ger telephony, the equipment may consist of the AES, cabin
telephone equipment in the cabin and a handset, which may be
"cordless." The fixed cabin telephone equipment is provided
with a credit card reader. When a passenger wants to make a
19 ICAO Doc. AN-Conf/11-IP/1 at 6.
20 Stephan Kaiser, Legal Implications of Satellite-Based Communication, Navigation
& Surveillance Systems for Civil Aviation, in GULDIMANN & KAiSER, supra note 8, at
154-55.
21 Id. (citing Shifrin, First Installation of (Satellite) APC-Telephone Approved by IN-
MARSAT, AviATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, November 19, 1989 at 76).




call, the typical sequence of events would be as follows: the pas-
senger walks from her seat to the central cabin telephone loca-
tion; then keys in her seat number and inserts an acceptable
credit card into the fixed cabin equipment. The handset is re-
leased after validation of the check bits and expiration date. In
the event that either of these checks fails, the card is returned
and the handset not released. Upon obtaining the handset, the
customer returns to her seat and can commence making one or
more telephone calls. Where telephones and associated credit
card readers are located at the passengers' seats, a somewhat
different procedure may apply. However, the procedure still in-
volves reading the credit card and validating the check bits and
expiration date before permitting the passenger to make calls.24
With regards to crew telephony, credit card validation proce-
dures are not required. Airline crew have access to special tele-
phone services and networks, according to requirements and
procedures developed by the airline industry. The capabilities
include at least the following: access to the full Public Switched
Telephone Network (PSTN) as for passengers, but without the
need for a credit card (billing would be direct to the aircraft
operator); access to specialized voice services via private net-
works, with or without address digits; ability to preempt an ex-
isting (passenger) call if necessary to make AES voice circuit
equipment, a satellite channel or Ground Earth Station (GES)
voice circuit equipment available; and ability to seize the next
available AES voice circuit equipment without clearing any calls
in progress. In the case of calls in the reverse direction, (i.e.
ground-to-air) selected fixed-network users are able to access air-
craft automatically by using the aircraft ID in the address digits.
Operator-connected access is also available pursuant to the
numbering plans enabling a PSTN subscriber to call the AES.25
This article examines application of the state sovereignty prin-
ciple to the inconsistencies surrounding the use by passengers
of satellite communications systems for non-safety purposes
within the legal and regulatory regimes that govern: outer space;
the oceans and polar regions; international air transport; inter-
national satellite telecommunications; trade aspects of interna-
tional economics; the state where the aircraft is certified and
24 International Telecommunication Standard: Union Telecommunication
Standardization Sector, Telephone/ISDN Numbering Plan for the Mobile-Satellite Ser-
vices of INMARSAT, ITU-T RECOMMENDATION E.215 (1997).
25 Id.
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registered; the state being flown over; and the state where the
ground facilities may have been established. Parts II and III will
examine the principle of state sovereignty and jurisdiction in
territorial airspace, above territorial waters and in the Polar Re-
gions. Parts IV and V will address sovereignty and international
trade law including the law applicable to outer space.
II. STATE SOVEREIGNTY OVER AIRSPACE AND
TERRITORIAL WATERS
Territorial sovereignty has been stated as extending "princi-
pally over land territory, the territorial sea appurtenant to the
land, and the seabed and subsoil of the territorial sea.26 The
concept of territory thus includes islands, islets, rocks, and
reefs.' '2' Furthermore, "in accordance with customary interna-
tional law and the dictates of convenience, the airspace
above . .. State territory is [sic] included. ' 2 Therefore, "the
State territory and its appurtenances (airspace and territorial
sea29), together with the government and population within its
frontiers, comprise the physical and social manifestations of the
primary type of international legal person, the State. 3 °
With this in mind, the International Court of Justice pro-
nounced in The Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua3 that
The basic legal concept of State sovereignty in customary international
law, expressed in inter alia, Article 2, paragraph 1, of the United Nations
Charter, extends to the internal waters and territorial sea of every State
and to the airspace above its territory. As to the superjacent airspace, the
1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation (Art. 1) reproduces the es-
26 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 105 (1998).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See Fisheries Case (UK. v. Nor.) 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18). Note however that
some coastal states, including the United States of America, Canada, Malaysia,
Australia and New Zealand, have claimed the right to exercise control over for-
eign aircraft beyond the limits of the airspace over their territorial waters.
NICHOLAS GRIEF, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE AIR SPACE OF THE HIGH SEAS
147 (1994). These claims to control have been made in areas referred to as Air
Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ). Id. The purpose being "to enhance the
protection of national security by making the entry of aircraft subject to identifi-
cation requirements." Id. Establishment of such zones do not however constitute
or imply a claim to sovereignty. Id. On the precise nature and validity of ADIZ's
in the context of international laws of the air and sea, see id. at 153-57.
30 BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 105-06.
31 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in & Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 111 (June 27).
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tablished principle of the complete and exclusive sovereignty of a State
over the airspace above its territory. That Convention, in conjunction
with the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, further specifies that the
sovereignty of a coastal State extends to the territorial sea and the airspace
above it, as does the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
adopted on 10 December 1982. The court has no doubt that these pre-
scriptions of treaty law merely respond to firmly established and long-
standing tenets of customary international law.32
Treaty provisions, the dictum of the ICJ, and opinion juris all
point to the fact that states exercise supreme and exclusive sov-
ereignty in their territorial jurisdictions,3 which for the purpose
of this article is comprised of the airspace above national terri-
tory and territorial waters, traversed by aircraft on-board which
S-APC services are provided and consumed. Nonetheless, the
methods by which states have chosen to exercise their sovereign
rights, within the listed jurisdictions and with regards to the
stated activities, when applied to S-APC, give rise to qualifica-
tions that require further examination. Thus there is a need to
reconcile conflicting complexes arising from the clash between
what one writer 3' has stated as consisting of a rule-complex
3
(founded on a regulatory philosophy influenced by the com-
mon international legal concept of state sovereignty) and an ac-
tivity-complex.3 6  These conflicting complexes themselves
appropriately reflect the enduring divide between what are com-
monly referred to as the spatialist and functionalist schools of
thought.3 The spatial approach, according to Bin Cheng, is the
primary nature of international lex lata, with its three-tier classifi-
cation of state jurisdiction (discussed infra), as opposed to the
32 Statute of the International Court ofJustice, 1945, C.II, art. 38 provides inter
alia that "The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with interna-
tional law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law."
33 M. DIXON & R. MCCORQUODALE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAw 26 (2000).
34 Henaku, supra note 12, at 103.
35 Differences in the legal/regulatory regimes governing: national airspace,
the airspace over the oceans, outer space, international aviation, telecommunica-
tions and trade aspects of international economic law. Id.
36 The technology and components of the future International Civil Aviation
Organisation's Communications Navigation Surveillance /Air Traffic Manage-
ment System in general. Id. at 104. This article addresses the activity-complex of
S-APC service provision. In other words, the technological infrastructure and sys-
tem architecture of mobile satellite communications for non-safety aeronautical
purposes.
37 BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAw 434-37 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter BIN CHENG (1) ].
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functional approach which, contends that the locus of an act
need be of no moment to its legality or illegality, which can be
determined solely by reference to its nature."8
Before going any further on this complex and/or conflict and
its application to air travel, there is a need to shed some light on
the origins 9 and nature of the sovereignty concept. It is neces-
sary to understand that the principle of sovereignty is regarded
as a fundamental concept in international law, and an integral
part of the principles of equality of states and of territorial integ-
rity and political independence that are referred to in Article 2
of the United Nations Charter.4 ° State sovereignty itself remains
inextricably linked to what is referred to as "territory," which in
spatial terms has been divided into four 41 categories, three of
which were first identified by Judge Max Huber, sitting as sole
arbitrator in the Island of Palmas Case (The Netherlands v. United
States) .42 These four categories are comprised of: national terri-
tory (over which one state, or in exceptional circumstances, two
or more states, exercises territorial sovereignty); territorium extra
commercium (territory which cannot form the territory of a state);
territorium nulluis (territories that are not under the sovereignty
of a recognized subject of international law, but which are capa-
ble of being acquired by any state in accordance with the rules
of international law governing acquisition of territory); and ter-
ritorium commune humanitatis ("the common heritage of
mankind") .4
In this context, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the North
Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v United States)44
stated that, "one of the essential elements of sovereignty is that it
is to be exercised within territorial limits, and that, failing proof
to the contrary, the territory is coterminous with sovereignty. 45
38 Id.
39 The concept of sovereignty originated in the closer association of the devel-
oping State and the developing community which became inevitable when it was
discovered that power had to be shared between them. The function of the con-
cept was to provide the only formula which could ensure the effective exercise of
power once this division of power or collaboration of forces had become ines-
capable. See DIXON & MCCORQUODALE, supra note 33, at 248 (citing H. HINSLEY,
SOVEREIGNTY 22-25 (1986)); see also John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New
Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'L LAw 782 (2003).
40 DIXON & MCCORQUODALE, supra note 33, at 248.
41 See BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 105; BIN CHENG (1), supra note 37, at 434-37.
42 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Per, Ct. Arb. 1928).
43 BIN CHENG (1), supra note 37, at 435-36.
44 11 R.I.A.A. 167, 180 (Permt.Ct. Arb. 1910).
45 DIXON &c McCORQUODALE, supra note 33, at 250.
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Consequently, the competence of states, in respect of their terri-
tory, is traditionally described in terms sovereignty as well as 'Ju-
risdiction. '46 In other words, the normal complement of state
rights, the typical case of legal competence (or legal personality)
is described commonly as "sovereignty," while particular rights,
or accumulations of rights quantitatively less than the norm, are
referred to as 'jurisdiction" (especially rights, or claims, liberties
and powers).47 Brownlie goes on to add, as far as the subject of
jurisdictional competence of states is concerned, that distinct
from the power to make decisions or rules (i.e., the prescriptive
or legislative jurisdiction), which in the opinion of this author
equates to the "particular rights" mentioned above, states also
have "power to take executive action in pursuance of or conse-
quent on the making of decisions or rules (i.e., the enforcement
or prerogative jurisdiction)."48 Bin Cheng on the other hand,
has chosen to refer to this distinction between prescriptive or
legislative jurisdiction vis-A-vis enforcement or prerogative juris-
diction, by using the terms 'Jurisfaction"49 and 'jurisaction,"5
respectively. 51
Bin Cheng bases this classification upon the recognition
under international law that states have over any one or a com-
bination of three types of jurisdiction, including "territorial ju-
risdiction" - "the jurisdiction to which a State is normally
entitled over its own territory, territory under its sovereignty";
"quasi-territorial jurisdiction" 
- jurisdiction of a state over "its
aircraft, spacecraft and... any other means of transport which is
designed for travel in areas not subject to the territorial jurisdic-
tion of any State ... and which has a special relationship with
the State concerned through ownership, nationality, registra-
tion, or any other recognized link"; and "personal jurisdiction" -
"the jurisdiction of a State over its own nationals, be they natural
or legal persons, excluding, however .... aircraft even though
46 BROWNLrE, supra note 26, at 106.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 301.
49 "The normative power of a State to enact laws, take decisions, and, if need
be, administratively or judicially to interpret such laws and decisions with legally
binding effect." Id.
50 "A State's power concretely and physically to perform the functions of a
State, be they legislative, judicial or executive. It may thus, under this power, hold
legislative assemblies, conduct judicial enquiries, carry out arrests, or establish
armed forces." Id.
51 BIN CHENG (1), supra note 37, at 38-39.
2004] 657
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they may be endowed with nationality. '5 2 The justification for
these various classifications and distinctions can be derived from
the proposition that jurisdiction is territorial, i.e., "the power of
a State over different objects of international law varies, above
all ratione loci, according to whether one is speaking of national
territories", or any of the three types of territory listed above."3
These jurisdictional complexities, when applied to the provision
of S-APC services on-board aircraft flying over national state ter-
ritories and oceanic open spaces, raise interesting international
civil and even criminal legal ramifications, considering that air-
craft do not readily fit within the jurisdictional rules of either
domestic or international law.
Nonetheless, the following examination of the sovereignty in
airspace principle should serve as a starting point for answering
questions relating to the principle's impact and effectiveness;
bearing in mind that although states may exercise sovereignty de
jure, the nature of the activity-complex in the case of end-to-end
S-APC service provisions, in most cases, places de facto control
in the hands of the entity(s) licensed (in most cases by third
states) to operate the infrastructure in question i.e., the satel-
lite (s), Aeronautical Earth Stations affixed to the aircraft frames,
aircraft, and ground-based infrastructure. Two questions require
clarification: first, the extent to which a state that is flown over
can control certain activities on board a foreign registered air-
craft within its territory; and second, whether the right to
overflight permits the use of facilities for non-safety
communications.
A. SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIALITY AND AIRSPACE
The principle of state sovereignty in airspace, traceable to dis-
cussions dating to the pre-World War I era, were crystallized in
the provisions of Article 1 to the Paris Convention on Aerial
Navigation of 1919, while in contemporary times the legal basis
for the exercise of sovereignty by states to the airspace over their
respective territories derives from the provisions of Article 1 to
the 1944 Chicago Convention,54 which declares, "The con-
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 NICHOLAS M. MArrE, AEROSPACE LAW 15-16 (1969) [hereinafter MATTE (1)].
Note that in addition to the 1919 Paris Convention, the Ibero-American Conven-
tion Relating to Aerial Navigation of 1926 and the Inter-American International
Convention on Commercial Aviation of 1928 were both based upon the national
sovereignty in airspace principle. See P.P.C. HAANAPPEL, THE LAW AND POLICY OF
658
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tracting States recognize that every State has complete and ex-
clusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory."' It has
been contended by Nicholas Matte that the "emphasis on the
principle of sovereignty is more understandable during troubled
times of war and periods immediately following, when interna-
tional conventions on air law have been drawn up and accepted,
creating principles to serve above all, as a means of national de-
fense. 56 Matte asserts further that the sovereignty principle,
however, "does not help peaceful development of international
navigation for economic, commercial or touristic reasons," lead-
ing to a need to replace the principle of sovereignty with one of
"freedom of functional international air traffic, which would at
the same time preserve the security of states."57
Before addressing the "freedom of functional international
traffic" proposition, to which we shall return in the context of S-
APC services provided to international civil aviation, note that in
order to apply the lateral limits of airspace sovereignty (a term
not defined by the Chicago Convention 51) one would also need
to appreciate the meaning of state territory defined in Article 2
to the Chicago Convention. This Article provides that, "For the
purpose of this Convention, the territory of a State shall be
deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent
thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or man-
date of such State. '59 This scenario contrasts sharply with the
freedom-of-the-air principle, which pertains above the high seas
because as it has also been contended, the innocent passage for
vessels and an "open-port policy" in maritime law is easier to
accept from the standpoint of national security than freedom-of-
AIR SPACE AND OUTER SPACE, A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 15 (2003) [hereinafter
HAANAPPEL (1) ].
55 Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature, Dec. 7, 1944,
art. 161 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
56 MATTE (1), supra note 54, at 17.
57 Id.
58 For a detailed attempt to provide a definition of the term 'airspace' see id. at
21-36.
59 Chicago Convention, supra note 55, art. 2. "The territorial scope of a States
Jurisdiction, as recognized and accepted by contracting States to the Chicago
Convention extends, therefore, upwards into space and downwards to the centre
of the earth, the whole in the shape of an inverted cone." See BIN CHENG, THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 121 (George W. Keeton & George
Schwartzenberger, eds. 1962) [hereinafter BIN CHENG (2)].
2004] 659
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the-air. 61 Vessels are physically limited to the high seas, territo-
rial waters, international straits and maritime ports and thus,
perhaps with the exception of submarines, are more easily iden-
tifiable. Aircraft on the other hand, move much more rapidly
and can penetrate any part of airspace above a given sovereign
state and are consequently far less easy to identify.6 '
Though the "freedom of functional international air traffic"
proposition made by Matte has yet to fully materialize, and in
spite of the security considerations underlying the sovereignty
principle and the extent of its territorial application, multilater-
ally-agreed economic aspects (including the right of overflight)
of present day62 international civil aviation continue to be
catered to under the Chicago Convention's Article 5 (non-
scheduled international services) and Article 6 (scheduled inter-
national services), respectively.6" In the words of Matte on one
hand, both Articles "provide the multilateral, quasi-universal ba-
sis of the legal framework for all international air services. ' 64 Ar-
ticle 5 is inspired by a relatively liberal spirit as the basis for a
more liberal regulatory regime for non-scheduled services and
flights, while Article 6, seeking to implement the sovereignty
principle of the Chicago Conventions Article 1, affords the basis
for a more restrictive and rigid regulatory regime for scheduled
air services.65 Haanappel, on the other hand, claims that the
Chicago Conventions Articles 5, 6 and 7, respectively, speak of
the "right" to make flights, and to operate air services, and that
"right" is the appropriate term set forth within multilateral and
bilateral agreements between states exchanging contractual
rights to fly aircraft, and to operate air services that derogate
from the customary international law principle of Article 1 of
the Chicago Convention, to the effect that each state has com-
plete and exclusive sovereignty in the airspace above its terri-
60 On the 'right of innocent passage' and the 'meaning of innocent passage'
within territorial waters, see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Dec. 10, 1982, art. 17, 19 [hereinafter UNCLOS 1982].
61 HAANAPPEL (1), supra note 54, at 16.
62 Attempts at fostering the widest possible multilateral freedom in interna-
tional civil aviation is not a recent development when one considers both the
provisions of Article 15 (as amended in 1929) to the 1919 Paris Convention as
well as Article XXI of the 1928 Havana Convention, respectively. Id.
63 NIcoLAs MATTE, TREATISE ON AIR-AERONAUTICAL LAw 140 (ICASL-McGill
University 1981) [hereinafter MATTE (2)].




tory.66 He contends further that there is a distinction between
the "rights/privileges of aircraft," "rights/privileges with respect
to international air services," and the "rights of airlines," and
that Articles 5 and 7 of the Chicago Convention speak of "rights
of aircraft," although Article 7 also uses the term "airlines,"
while two agreements (discussed infra) annexed to the Chicago
Convention speak of "rights and privileges" with respect to "in-
ternational air services," and finally that bilateral agreements are
concerned with the rights of designated air carriers to operate
on certain routes.67
Bearing the above arguments in mind, the freedom of move-
ment by aircraft across multiple borders continues to be facili-
tated pursuant to the provisions of the International Air Services
Transit Agreement ("Transit Agreement") and the International
Air Transport Agreement, ("Transport Agreement") annexed to
the Chicago Convention, the combined effect of which give rise
to what is now accepted by several writers, including, Bin Cheng,
Matte, Diedericks-Verschoor and Haanappel, as constituting the
Freedoms of the Air.68 The Transit and Transport Agreements -
especially the Transport Agreement 69 - provide a multilateral,
contractual exchange of sovereign rights that greatly facilitates
the performance of international air services having to cross
many jurisdictions; although for those countries that have not
ratified the Transit Agreement, over-flight rights would have to
be negotiated bilaterally.7v Under Bilateral Air Transport Agree-
ments (BATS), "States exchange traffic rights and/or overflight
rights leaving the exercise of the commercial modalities thereof
largely to the management judgment of designated airlines,
66 HAANAAPPEL (1), supra note 54, at 104-05.
67 Id.
68 The first two freedoms are described in the Transit Agreement, and concern
the freedom to fly over a country or to make a technical landing. They are also
listed in the Transport Agreement, together with three more freedoms. The third
freedom enables the state to carry passengers and cargo from its own territory to
a foreign State, whereas the fourth concerns the transport of passengers and
cargo from a foreign state to its own territory. The right to carry passengers and
cargo between two foreign states is contained in the fifth freedom. I.H.PH.
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAw 13 (7th ed. 2001). See also
BIN CHENG (2), supra note 59, at 9-12; MATTE (2), supra note 63, at 143; HAANAP-
PEL (1), supra note 54, at 103-109; P.P.C. Haanappel, The Transformation of Sover-
eignty in the Air, XX AIR & SPACE L. 311, 315 (1995) [hereinafter Haanappel (2)]
69 The Transport Agreement, regarded as the five freedoms agreement re-
mains poorly ratified. Haanappel (2), supra note 68, at 315.
70 Id. at 316.
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rather than to governmental influence. 71 Such agreements do
not fundamentally change the concept of sovereignty; rather
they modify and liberalize its exercise without detracting from
the basic notion of sovereignty expressed in Articles 1 and 6 of
the Chicago Convention. Thus, confirming the pre-existing na-
ture of state sovereignty over its airspace now accepted as a part
of customary international law and declared in the Chicago
Convention, while bearing in mind the present combined effect
of the Transit Agreement as well as BATS, leads one to the belief
that there is an evolution in the exercise of national sovereignty
through liberal BATS and the opening up by a number of states
of their hitherto closed borders to international travel.72
An interesting illustration of circumstances where the concept
and/or application of sovereignty in airspace has been extended
from the multilateral exchange of rights between states to the
actual transfer of such rights to a third party can be made with
the steps currently being taken by the European Community to
formulate what has been regarded as the "Single European
Sky."7 3 In this respect and according to Article 3(f) of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community (EC), the EC is empow-
ered to develop a common transport policy pursuant to a legal
basis for EC action to establish a policy in the area of airspace
management and design set forth in the Treaty's Article 80(2).4
That Article provides that "the Council may, acting by a quali-
fied majority, decide whether, to what extent and by what proce-
dure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air
transport. The procedural provisions of Article 71 shall apply. 75
Article 80(2), therefore, offers a broad legal basis for the imple-
mentation of that Treaty's objectives in the area of air transport.
It has already been used for EC action in this area, most recently
as a legal basis for the European Commission's proposal for a
Council Regulation establishing the European Aviation Safety
Agency.76 In general, it allows for EC measures intended to:
71 P.P.C. Haanappel, The Transformation of Sovereignty in the Air 19 in THE USE
OF AIR AND OUTER SPACE COOPERATION AND COMPETITION 13-26 (Chia-Jui Cheng
ed. 1995) [hereinafter Haanappel (3)].
72 Id. at 25-26.
73 http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air/single-sky/index-en.htm (last
visited Feb. 6, 2005).
74 Consolodated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
art. 3(f), 2002 OJ. (C325) 1, 40 [hereinafter Consolodated Treaty].
75 Id. art. 80(2).
76 Established on July 15, 2002, of a new European Community ("EC") system
of, inter alia, air safety, to be based upon the mandate of a European Aviation
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* Implement the free movement guarantees under the
Treaty;
* Harmonize airspace classifications and standards; and
* Set down minimum standards in relation to a European
airspace.
It has been argued that ordinarily states have no right to trans-
fer matters regarding the air space above their territories to a
supranational organization such as the EC (or another state).V
According to this view, Article 1 of the Chicago Convention,
which recognizes the complete and exclusive sovereignty as be-
longing to the contracting state, would be deemed to be
mandatory.78 Thus, any transfer of sovereign rights to another
state or institution would seem to be excluded by the Chicago
Convention.79 However, the same source argues that
Article 1 did not establish the sovereignty of states over their air
space, contending thereto, that Article 1 of the Chicago Conven-
tion and Annex 11 (Air Traffic Services) merely recognized the
pre-existing concept of sovereignty." Consequently, those provi-
sions acknowledge the right of the parties to their sovereignty,
but do not create an obligation for the parties to keep it."1 In
other words, Article I is of a declaratory rather than a constitu-
tive nature. It is generally accepted that sovereignty over air space
can be seen as a derivative of sovereignty over the territory of a
state. Territorial sovereignty being essentially a concept of owner-
ship, while the territory remaining (part of) the state's property.
Therefore, as with any other property right, the state is free to
transfer the sovereignty over its air space, in part or whole, to
another state or a supranational organization. By (partially) dele-
gating sovereign rights, the ceding state allows another state or a
supranational organization to exercise certain actions on/over its
territory.8 2
Safety Agency ("EASA") expected to commence its operations in September
2003. It was also used as a legal basis for Council Directive 93/65/EEC of 19 July
1993 on the definition and use of compatible technical specifications for the pro-
curement of air-traffic-management equipment and systems, 1993 O.J. No(L187)
52, which serves for the implementation of Eurocontrol Standards.
77 STUDY FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF AIRSPACE
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A similar illustration, where a significant exchange of sover-
eign rights over airspace between and amongst states has oc-
curred, can be made with reference to the Minsk Agreement 3
pertaining to the airspace above the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (of the former Union of Soviet and Socialist Re-
publics) comprised of the Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia,
Georgia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrguyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, and the Russian Federa-
tion. 4 In this instance, it is contended by Yuri Kolosov et al, that
pursuant to the Minsk Agreement, the airspace of contracting
states over which they have complete and exclusive sovereignty,
as well as those regions of open airspace, where, according to
international treaties, air traffic maintenance was assigned to the
former USSR for the purpose of organizing the execution of
flights and Air Traffic Control, would now be considered to be
common airspace."' The aforementioned authors, in so con-
tending, re-affirm the principle of complete and exclusive sover-
eignty of a state over the airspace above its territory, recognized
by Article 1 of the 1944 Chicago Convention, claiming that the
Chicago Convention does not prejudice the establishment by
certain states (on the basis of mutual agreement) of a "com-
mon" airspace for functional purposes.8 6 They consequently
make reference to the Convention on Cooperation in the Field
of Air Navigation and Joint Organization and Ensuring of Air
Traffic in the Upper Air-Space of Western Europe as an exam-
ple of a useful precedent where common airspace for functional
purposes has been agreed upon and established between nation
states.
87
In view of the totality of arguments and assertions examined
above, suffice it to state "that no aircraft may fly in, into or
through a State's national airspace without its permission, acqui-
escence or tolerance, at no matter what altitude," and "once
within the territory of another State, a foreign aircraft, together
83 Agreement on Civil Aviation and Airspace Utilization, 25 December 1991, ICAO
Reg. No. 3720.
84 For an examination of the legal status of the single CIS airspace vis-A-vis the
sovereignty of the superjacent states, see Phillip Saprykin, The Legal Status of the
Airspace above the Commonwealth of Independent States, XXII ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE
L. 325, 325-33 (1995); Yury Kolosov, Yury Maleev & Alexander Travnikov, Com-
mon Airspace of the CIS Member-States, AIR AND SPACE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 108-
11 (Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel ed. 1999).





with its crew and passengers, must comply with local laws and
regulations."8 This led one to assert that states exercise su-
preme and exclusive sovereignty in the airspace above their ter-
ritory and the territorial waters adjacent thereto, although
treaties, multilateral and bilateral, may give rise to an exchange
of such national sovereignty rights over airspace.89
B. NATIONALITY OF AIRCRAFT 90
Having examined the nature and extent of those sovereign
rights that states exercise over their national territory, including
the superjacent airspace, it is only proper to determine if and
how such authority by states can be exercised with respect to the
actual objects that traverse the airspace governed by individual
states, (i.e. the aircraft equipped with S-APC service consumed
by individual airline passengers). The question of nationality of
aircraft, as it pertains to the provision of S-APC, is almost as im-
portant as the principle of sovereignty discussed above. This is
especially true because the primary rule applicable to the con-
duct of S-APC set forth in the Chicago Convention's Article
30(a) provides that:
Aircraft of each contracting State may, in or over the territory of
other contracting States, carry radio transmitting apparatus only
if a license to install and operate such apparatus has been issued
by the appropriate authorities of the State in which the Aircraft is
registered. The use of radio transmitting apparatus in the terri-
tory of the Contracting State whose territory is flown over shall be
in accordance with regulations prescribed by that State.91
In addition, but more importantly, Article 30(b) of the Chicago
Convention provides that "Radio transmitting apparatus may be
used only by members of the flight crew who are provided with a
special license for the purpose, issued by the appropriate au-
thorities of the State in which the aircraft is registered."92
The words contained in the body of Article 30 (a), "carry radio
transmitting apparatus only if a license to install and operate
88 BIN CHENG (2), supra note 59, at 122.
89 Haanappel (3), supra note 71, at 13-36.
go See John C. Cooper, A Study on the Legal Status of Aircraft, EXPLORATIONS IN
AEROSPACE LAw 215-50 (Ivan Vlasic ed., 1968);John C. Cooper, National Status of
Aircraft, 15J. AIR L. & CoM. 292 (1950); DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 68, at
22-25; MATtE (2), supra note 63, at 180-81; BIN CHENG (2), supra note 59, at 128-
32; HAANAPPEL (1), supra note 54, at 46-48.
91 Chicago Convention, supra note 55, art. 30.
92 Id.
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such apparatus has been issued by the appropriate authorities of
the State in which the Aircraft is registered" and those con-
tained in the body of Article 30(b), "appropriate authorities of
the State in which the aircraft is registered" are probably the
most pertinent in this regard.9 3 The reason for this is that air-
craft have the nationality of the state in which they are regis-
tered, per the provisions of Article 17 of the Chicago
Convention. 4 Consequently, licenses, which are issued for radio
transmitting apparatus and for those of the flight crew must be
issued or certified by the state in which the aircraft has been
registered. 95 The private international legal ramifications of
these circumstances are most evident in matters pertaining
firstly to the problems of jurisdiction in civil and/or criminal
matters which may arise on board an aircraft resulting from the
provision of S-APC services; and secondly, the problems pertain-
ing to the liability of the airline, or of the air carrier or operator
towards passengers and third parties on the ground. These mat-
ters however fall outside the scope of this article.
III. STATE JURISDICTION IN THE AIRSPACE OVER HIGH
SEAS AND POLAR REGIONS
Air traveling demands an entertaining, pleasant, secure and
productive environment for passengers who may spend 70 per-
cent of their total travel time in the aircraft on long-distance
flights. Further, it is correct to assume that long-distance flights
will traverse open trans-oceanic and polar routes. These facts
give rise to several questions, including: firstly, whether S-APC
services may be offered in geographical regions of this nature;
secondly, if this is possible, whether authorizations would be re-
quired; thirdly, what sorts of authorizations would be required
to be obtained; and fourthly, from which authority. Therefore
the nature and extent to which the concept of state sovereignty
applies in the open spaces of the high seas and the Arctic Re-
gion constitutes the theme of this section.
A. AIRSPACE ABOVE THE HIGH SEAS
A significant part of the geographical area over which the S-
APC services are currently being provided, or planned to be pro-
vided to aircraft, are the "high seas," which constitute "all parts
93 Id.
94 Id. art. 17.
95 BIN CHENG (2), supra note 59, at 129.
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of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone,
in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State."96 This definition, it
has been contended, infers that the exclusive economic zone 7
(EEZ) is optional except where a coastal state includes such a
zone, and that a significant proportion of the freedoms of the
high seas (discussed infra) are according to the UNCLOS 1982,
applicable in the EEZ. 98 Note that, besides the rights of states to
establish EEZ's under binding treaty provisions of the UNCLOS
1982, the establishment of EEZ's is a concept which has also
been firmly established under customary international law.99
The aforementioned definition of the high seas, the optional
right of states to the claim of an EEZ, and the application of
international law to the said EEZ on the one hand, and high
seas on the other hand, all warrant a close examination. With
regards to the EEZ, Michael Milde, referring to Articles 56 and
58 respectively of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS 1982), states that the EEZ is an area of the
sea which was given a specific legal regime." ° In clarifying the
nature of the EEZ, Milde contends that "the EEZ is a zone sui
generis with special rights reserved for the coastal State and the
traditional freedoms of the high seas (minus the rights reserved
for the coastal State) maintained for other States.""1 1 The sover-
eign rights of the coastal state within the EEZ relate only to the
natural resources of the sea; the coastal state cannot interfere
with the other traditional freedoms of the high seas, in particu-
lar the right of navigation and overflight. In other words, special
economic rights and jurisdiction over the resources and installa-
tions are granted to the coastal state, whilst the traditional free-
96 UNCLOS 1982, supra note 60, art. 86.
97 "The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territo-
rial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this part, under which
the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of
other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention." Id. art.
55. "The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." Id.
art. 57.
98 BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 229.
99 See Continental Shelf Case (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 1CJ18; Gulf of Maine Case
(Can. v. U.S.), 1984 ICJ 246; Continental Shelf Case (Libya v. Malta), 1985 ICJ Rep
13.
100 M. Milde, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - Possible implications
for International Air Law, VIII ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE LAW, 167-200 (1983).
101 Id.
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doms of the high seas, including in particular the right of
navigation and overflight, are maintained.
The jurisdiction that the coastal state can exercise in the EEZ
relates to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installa-
tions and structures, marine scientific research, and the protec-
tion and preservation of the marine environment. 112 Thus, with
respect to traditional freedoms of the high seas exercisable by
all states, the coastal state is not granted any precedence or pri-
ority. Consequently, pursuant to the provisions of Article 87 of
the UNCLOS 1982, and as far as the focus of this article is con-
cerned, within the EEZ all states enjoy the freedom of overflight,
referred to in Article 87 of the Convention, and other interna-
tionally lawful uses of the sea integral to that freedom and asso-
ciated with the operation of aircraft. 10 3 This freedom of
overflight must be exercised with due regard to the rights and
duties of the coastal state, and aircraft must comply with the
coastal state's laws and regulations adopted in accordance with
the UNCLOS 1982 under Article 58(3).104
Beyond the EEZ however, in addressing the legal regime of
the high seas, Article 87 of the UNCLOS established the princi-
ple of freedom of the high seas by stating that:
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-
locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the con-
ditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of
102 UNCLOS, supra note 60, art 60. The rights of states and jurisdiction which
can be exercised over artificial islands constitute an interesting facet of the EEZ's
legal regime, especially in the light of the desire for States (such as the Nether-
lands) to construct artificial islands to serve as airports outside of territorial wa-
ters. Complex questions would necessarily arise regarding the rights of other
States to use the airspace over such airports including the rights to use such an
airport without bilateral air services agreements with the State that has con-
structed such an airport. For the various views on the issues arising, see Haanap-
pel (3), supra note 71, at 23; E.J. Molenaar, Airports at Sea: International Legal
Implications, 14 INT'LJ. OF MARINE & COASTAL L. 371-386 (1999); H. Wassenbergh,
The Status and Use of an Airport on an Artificial Island, XXIV AIR & SPACE L. 178
(1999); W. Lawrence, Superports, Airports and Other Fixed Installations on the High
Seas, 6J. OF MAR. L. & COM. 575-91 (1975).
103 See 1 R. JENNINGS & SIR A. WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 6
343 (9th ed. 1992).
104 On the subject of the airspace over the EEZ in general, see Kay Hailbronner,
Freedom of the Air and the Convention of the Law of the Sea, 77 AM.J. INT'L L. 490, 509-
10 (1983); Kay Hailbronner, The Legal Regime of the Airspace Above the Exclusive
Economic Zone, VIII AIR LAw 30, 30-40 (1983); Paul P. Heller, Airspace over Extended
Jurisdictional Zones, LAw OF THE SEA: NEGLECTED ISSUES, 135, 142-43 (John
KGamble, Jr. ed., 1978); David J. Attard, THE EXCLUSrVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAw 80 (1987).
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international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and
land-locked States:
a. Freedom of navigation;
b. Freedom of overflight;
c. Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines subject to
Part VI;
d. Freedom to construct artificial islands and other installa-
tions permitted under international law, subject to Part
VI;
e. Freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down
in Section 2;
f. Freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and
XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due re-
gard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the
freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the
rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the
area.
1 0 5
From the foregoing, it is evident that the scope of the high
seas extends to the superjacent airspace, to which the UNCLOS
1982 makes reference when establishing the freedoms men-
tioned hereinbefore, where states may exercise a freedom to fly
over, individually or collectively. An area to which, it has been
stated, "relatively little attention has been paid, despite the ex-
tent of that airspace and its commercial, strategic and environ-
mental significance. 10 6 On the subject of freedom of overflight
established by the UNCLOS 1982, a related rule under Articles
37, 38 and 39 must be noted, pertaining to the right of transit
passage in straits used for international navigation. Under the
right of transit passage, aircraft enjoy the right of unimpeded
transit passage in straits used for international navigation be-
tween one part of the high seas, or an EEZ, and another part of
the high seas or an EEZ.10 7 "Transit passage" when applied to
aircraft therefore mean the freedom of overflight solely for the
purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait.1°8 In
this respect, aircraft, while exercising the right of transit pas-
sage, must proceed without delay through or over the straits and
must refrain from the threat or use of force against the sover-
105 UNCLOS, supra note 60, art. 87.
106 Philip Allot, Mare Nostrum: A new International Law of the Sea, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 767 (1992); Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practices of the United States Relat-
ing to International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 237 (1990); GRIEF, supra note 29, at 1.
107 ICAO Doc. LC/29-WP/81, 10/3/94 at 11.
108 Id.
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eignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the
states bordering the state. 10 9 Such aircraft must refrain from any
activities other than those incident to their normal modes of
continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by
force majeure or by distress.110 Furthermore, aircraft in transit
passage, shall first observe the rules of the air (discussed infra)
as they apply to civil aircraft, and second, at all times, monitor
the radio frequency assigned by the competent internationally
designated air traffic control authority or the appropriate inter-
national distress radio frequency.
Having given thought to the statements made above, the issue
to consider here remains the freedom to provide S-APC services
on board aircraft exercising the right to fly over the EEZ, inter-
national straits or the high seas respectively, including the Polar
Regions, and the extent to which the concept of state sover-
eignty may or may not be applicable. From the foregoing, such
activity cannot be rightly stated as being comprehensively regu-
lated by the principal international instruments expected to reg-
ulate the use of the high seas and the superjacent airspace
thereto, i.e. the UNCLOS 1982, and thus it is for this reason that
the provisions of the 1944 Chicago Convention as well as the
Constitution, Convention and Radio Regulations of the ITU, be-
come pertinent. In this respect, and with regards to civil aviation
and non-safety aeronautical communications in the airspace of
the high seas, while the freedom of flight over the high seas is
proclaimed in the UNCLOS 1982, the actual regulation of flight
in this geographical area is specifically dealt with under the pro-
visions of Article 12,111 to the Chicago Convention, which pro-
vides that:
Each contracting State undertakes to adopt measures to insure
that every aircraft flying over or manoeuvring within its territory
and that every aircraft carrying its nationality mark, wherever
such aircraft may be, shall comply with the rules and regulations
relating to flight and manoeuvre of aircraft there in force. Each
Contracting State undertakes to keep its own regulations in these
respects uniform, to the greatest possible extent, with those es-
tablished from time to time under this Convention. Over the
high seas, the rules in force shall be those established under this
109 Id.
110 Id.
"' For an analysis of the provisions of Article 12 to the Chicago Convention,
see Dr. Jean Carroz, International Legislation on Air Navigation over the High Seas, 26
J. AIR L. & COM. 158, 158-72 (1959).
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Convention. Each State undertakes to insure the prosecution of
all persons violating the regulations applicable. 112
The provisions of Annex 2 to the Chicago Convention imple-
ment the Rules of the Air referred to in Article 12 of the Chi-
cago Convention. The foreword to this annex provides, inter
alia, "the Annex constitutes the Rules relating to the flight and
manoeuvre of aircraft within the meaning of Article 12. There-
fore over the high seas these rules shall apply without excep-
tion.""1 3 The applicability of Annex 2 without exception is
further reiterated in the Annexes' Chapter 2.1.1, while its rele-
vance to the high seas is confirmed in Chapter 2.1.2.114 The ef-
fect of Article 12, then is that the ICAO Rules of the Air stated in
Annex 2 are mandatory for flights over the high seas, and any
discretion given in Article 37 of the Chicago Convention would
not apply. A close examination of Annex 2 reveals that the regu-
lation of communications set forth in Chapter 3.6.5 applies to
controlled flights and deals with maintenance of listening watch,
establishment of two-way communication and procedures on
communication failure under the general heading of Air Traffic
Control services.1 15 No mention is made of passenger non-safety
communications, such as would be conducted by providing S-
APC services directly to aircraft.
One other annex to the Chicago Convention, which ought to
contain detailed regulations addressing the provision of S-APC
services to aircraft over the high seas, is Annex 10, concerning
aeronautical communications. Annex 10, comprised of four
volumes, in essence implements specific provisions of the Chi-
cago Convention, namely: Article 28 (Air navigation facilities
and standard systems), Article 30 (Aircraft radio equipment),
Article 69 (Improvement of air navigation facilities) and Article
83, respectively. However, Annex 10 makes reference to the ITU
Radio Regulations, which on a close examination provide spe-
cific provisions relating to the conduct of aeronautical commu-
nications services for non-safety purposes. 116 In this regard, and
in order to ensure adequate protection for safety and regularity
of flight messages, provisions are included in the Standards and
Recommended Practices elaborated in the said Annex, thereby
112 See Chicago Convention, supra note 55.
113 T. UNMACK, CIVL AVIATION: STANDARDS & LIABILITIEs 42 (1999).
114 Id. at 43.
115 Id.
116 ITU Radio Regulations art. 48.
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guaranteeing safety related messages, which have priority and
pre-emption over other non-safety aeronautical users.117 Be-
cause these principles of priority and pre-emption guarantee the
precedence of communications for safety purposes, non-safety
communications must cease immediately if necessary to permit
transmissions of messages accorded a certain order of priority.
Considered within this framework, one can presume that non-
safety communications, such as S-APC services to passengers on
board aircraft over the high seas, is by deduction permitted, al-
beit on a non-interference basis.
At this juncture it is important to stress that "the principle of
the freedom of the high seas has been described as multiforme et
fugace, and in truth it is a 'general principle of international law,
or a policy concept, from which particular rules must be de-
duced. Its application to specific problems often fails to give pre-
cise results.' 11118 This statement explains the difficulty one faces
in attempting to provide answers to the questions posed above,
bearing in mind the Rules of the Air set forth in the Chicago
Convention's Article 12.111 First, whether S-APC services may be
offered, in geographical regions of this nature; second, if this is
permitted, whether authorizations would be required; third,
what sorts of authorizations would be required to be obtained;
and fourth, from which authority. In this respect, Carroz sub-
mits that as no state may claim territorial sovereignty over the
high seas or the airspace above, the obligation to insure compli-
ance with the rules there in force can only rest with each con-
tracting state with respect to the aircraft carrying its nationality
mark.120 The rules in force over the high seas established under
the Chicago Convention are supposedly implemented in na-
tional laws and regulations. 121 Thus the obligation of each con-
tracting state to insure the prosecution of all persons violating
the regulations applicable concerns only the violation of its own
regulations by aircraft carrying its own nationality mark.
B. AIRSPACE OVER THE ARCTIC REGION
On the extent to which the regime set forth in the UNCLOS
1982 addressing the high seas is applicable to S-APC, the Arctic
117 Id. art. 51.
118 BROWNLIE, supra note 27, at 231.
119 Chicago Convention, supra note 55, art. 12.




Region merits special attention, not only because it is comprised
of sea-ice without any underlying landmass, but also because it is
a region over which the conduct of civil aviation continues to
take place and to which varying claims of territorial sovereignty
have been made. 122 In the 1970's, although authors such as
Pharand had observed that the freedom of overflight was being
exercised in the superjacent airspace of the arctic, in present
times, the existence of polar routes would indicate that the use
of polar airspace, with the attendant right to conduct aeronauti-
cal communications for non-safety purposes such as S-APC, falls
within the scope of arrangements involving individual states.1 23
In this respect,
although the new cross-polar routes take international flights
over previously untraveled territory, commercial airlines have
been flying in the polar region north of the Arctic Circle for
more than 40 years. In 1954, Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS)
inaugurated DC-6B service from Copenhagen to Los Angeles via
Sondre Stromfjord. In 1957, SAS began polar services from Co-
penhagen to Tokyo via Anchorage. From that time through the
mid-1980s, flights through the polar region increased as
Anchorage became the primary stopping point for passenger
traffic between Europe and East Asia. In 1983, Finnair inaugu-
rated the first non-stop service from Europe to Japan by flying
from Helsinki north through the polar region and down the Ber-
ing Strait to Tokyo. Today, hundreds of flights operate each week
over the interior of Russia en route between Europe and Asia.
Similarly, a large volume of traffic crosses the Atlantic north of
Iceland and the Arctic Circle on flights between Europe and the
West Coast of North America. Development of the new cross-po-
lar routes began in 1994, when the Russian government initiated
work with the airlines and the international community to estab-
lish a series of polar routes through its airspace. By mid-1998, the
current four cross-polar routes were defined and made available
for demonstration flights. The first official polar-route flight by a
commercial airline was conducted in July 1998. U.S. and Asian
airlines then conducted more than 650 demonstration flights
under special arrangements with Russian authorities. Today, air-
122 On the various schools of thought attempting to explain the legal status of
the arctic sea, and the analysis of various writers regarding the "Sector Principle,"
see GRIEF, supra note 29, at 24-28; ARTHUR WATS, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE
ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 113 (1992). See also John C. Cooper, Air Space Rights
Over the Arctic in EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAw 171 (Ivan Vlasic ed., 1968).
123 DONAT PHARAND, THE LAW OF THE SEA OF THE ARCTIC 176-79 (1973).
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lines operate non-stop 747 and 777 service to destinations in Asia
via the polar routes. 124
On a related note and pursuant to ICAO Assembly Resolution
A33-13 (Use of Crosspolar Routes) it is stated that the establish-
ment of a formal structure was the result of the combined ef-
forts made by Canada, China, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Japan,
Mongolia, Norway, the Russian Federation and the United
States who demonstrated an unprecedented spirit of interna-
tional cooperation in resolving this most complex task.125 Fur-
thermore, the resolution states that the structure became
operational on February 1, 2001, with the announcement of the
Russian Aviation Authorities about the implementation of the
cross-polar airways system traversing the waters of the Arctic
Ocean. 126 And more importantly, the "use of cross-polar routes
shall be open for aircraft of all Contracting States in accordance
with the provisions of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation. ' 1
2 7
In both polar regions, the Arctic as well as Antarctica, use has
been made of lines of longitude converging at the poles to pro-
duce a sector of sovereignty by a number of States (Canada and
the former USSR) .128 Brownlie contends that "while the 'sec-
tor'principle does not give title which would ordinarily arise oth-
erwise if the necessary State activity occurs, it represents a
reasonable application of the principles of effective occupa-
tion 129 as they are now understood, and as they were applied in
the Eastern Greenland Case."13 However, if a national claim to ex-
ercise territorial sovereignty over Arctic land areas is valid, the
claimant state's sovereignty extends to the territorial sea and the
superjacent airspace in accordance with the normal rules of in-
124 Polar Routes Offer New Opportunities, available at http://www/boeing.
com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_ 16/polar routeopportunities.html (last
visited on June 1, 2005).
125 A33-13: Use of Crosspolar Routes, available at http://www.icao.int/icao/
en/res/a33_13.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 WATTS, supra note 122, at 113.
129 Contemporary approaches to international law consider three primary mat-
ters with respect to sovereignty over territory: effective occupation, consent and
the right of self-determination. The main basis for establishing sovereignty over
territory today is by effective occupation, being the continuous and peaceful dis-
play of sovereignty. See BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 136-42; DixoN & McCOR-
QUODALE, supra note 33, at 258; (Neth. v. U.S.) 2 RLAA 829 (1928).
130 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case (Nor. v. Den.) P.C.IJ. Rep Ser A/B
(1933) No. 53.
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ternational law, i.e., the UNCLOS 1982 and 1944 Chicago Con-
vention. This assertion should be considered in the context of
the fact that the Arctic itself has been determined to be an area
of floating sea-ice without any underlying land mass, and thus
the basis for applying the sector principle in this region be-
comes questionable since "there is no polar land mass for sector
claims to relate to and the land base for the sector is part of a
land mass which is external to and distinct from, although adja-
cent to, the area covered by the sector claim." '131 This assertion
should also be understood in the light of the fact that the sector
principle has neither been confirmed by rules of international
law nor established as a principle of customary international law
and is generally not considered by several writers on the subject,
as a sufficient legal basis of title. 1
32
C. ANTARCTIC AIRSPACE
Quite like the Arctic region, Antarctica is not without its own
international legal complexities. The principle difference how-
ever, with far reaching consequences, is that Antarctica is a land
mass and remains subject to the provisions of the 1959 Antarctic
Treaty133 (AT) that came into force on 23 June 1961.13 The
effect of the AT, as far as the subject of sovereignty is concerned,
has presumably frozen the existing claims3 - and potential
claims 36 that could be made by states in Antarctica, noting that
131 WATTS, supra note 122, at 113.
132 Id.
133 Antarctic Treaty, Aug. 4, 1961, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. The Antarctic Treaty to-
gether with five separate international agreements provide the rules which gov-
ern activities in Antarctica and collectively they are known as the Antarctic Treaty
System (ATS). These five international agreements are: CONVENTION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF ANTARCTIC SEALS (1972); CONVENTION ON THE CONSERVATION
OF ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING RESOURCES (1980); Convention on the Regulation
of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (1988); PROTOCOL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION TO THE ANTARCTIC TREATY (1991).
134 At present, forty-four countries have acceded to it. Consultative (voting)
status is open to all countries who have demonstrated their commitment to the
Antarctic by conducting significant research. Twenty-seven nations have Consult-
ative status. See http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/AboutAntarctica/Treaty/treaty
peru.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
135 "Seven States, namely: Chile, Argentina, United Kingdom, Norway, Austra-
lia, France and New Zealand had made claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarc-
tica." RUDIGER WOLFRUM, THE CONVENTION ON REGULATION OF ANTARCTICA
MINERAL RESOURCE ACTIVITIES - AN ATTEMPT TO BREAK NEW GROUND 34 (1991).
136 "In 1958 both the United States of America and the USSR, had reserved all
rights arising from the previous activities of their nationals, as a consequence of
which both States were referred as States asserting a basis of claim." Id.
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non-claimant states do not assert claims or recognize the legal
validity of other claims. The area itself is defined under Article
VI of the AT to mean "the area south of 600 South Latitude,
including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall
prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the
rights, of any State under international law with regard to the
high seas within that area. ' 137 Bearing the above facts in mind,
an attempt to answer the questions pertaining to claims of sover-
eignty to parts of Antarctica by states, and by consequence the
airspace thereto, would require an examination of the provi-
sions of AT's Article IV which states that:
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted
as:
b. a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously as-
serted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica;
b. a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party
of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarc-
tica which it may have whether as a result of its activities
or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;
c. prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as re-
gards its recognition or non-recognition of any other
State's rights of or claim or basis of claim to territorial
sovereignty in Antarctica.
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is
in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or
denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or cre-
ate any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim or
enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in
force.138
In addition, the AT's Article VII (4) remains pertinent be-
cause it states that "Aerial observation may be carried out at any
time over any or all areas of Antarctica by any of the Contracting
Parties having the right to designate observers.
139
The provisions above must be construed in the light of the
fact that were Antarctic claims to be regarded as valid, such
claims would extend beyond the claimed territory (in this case a
"sector") to the territorial sea and superjacent airspace. If this
were to be the case, then only in the airspace beyond the claim-





ant state's territory does the freedom of overflight prevail.
Whereas, if a territorial claim is invalid, or if there is no claim,
the waters adjacent to the coast would be considered as high
seas and the airspace above those waters would be subject to the
international regime of the airspace of the high seas, i.e., the
UNCLOS 1982 and Chicago Convention of 1944. With regards
to the validity of Antarctic territorial claims, (of which diverse
views have been made) it is contended by Rothwell that:
The provisions of the AT have sought to take into account the
positions of each of the various parties which had an interest in
Antarctica at the time of the Treaty's negotiation and can be in-
terpreted to mean:
1. The treaty is not to be taken as a renunciation of existing
claims to territorial sovereignty by any party.
2. The treaty is not to be taken as a renunciation or diminution
of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty which any party
may have.
3. The treaty does not prejudice the position of any party as
regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other
party's right of or claim to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica. 140
The reality of this ambiguous situation, as far as claims to sov-
ereignty in Antarctica and attendant airspace is concerned, is
evidenced by the continuing claims to sovereignty and jurisdic-
tion by States even in recent times.
1 41
IV. SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
Prior to 1996, the international trade in services and the regu-
lation of such trade had been the subject of bilateral agreements
dealing with the treatment of nationals of the parties thereto or
regional agreements, which could also be bi-lateral, constituting
free trade areas or customs unions. Recognizing the growing im-
portance of trade in services for the growth and development of
the world economy it became necessary to establish a multilat-
140 DONALD R. ROTHWELL, THE PoLAR REGIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 76 (1996).
141 See Proclamation (Maritime Zone) No. 1 of 1993 in UNITED NATIONS, DoVI-
SION FOR OcEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, LAW
OF THE SEA BULLETIN No. 24, p.4 7 (1993), wherein the United Kingdom estab-
lished a 200-mile maritime zone around South Georgia and the Sandwich Is-
lands. Also by Proclamation of 26July 1994, Australia established a 200 mile EEZ
in relation, inter alia, to the external territories, which include the Australian
Antarctic Territory. Id.
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eral framework of principles and rules for trade in services with
a view to the expansion of such trade under conditions of trans-
parency and progressive liberalization and as a means of pro-
moting the economic growth of all trading partners and the
development of developing countries. 14 2 In the context of satel-
lite communications it has been contended that the first prereq-
uisite for an open, competitive market is a legal and regulatory
structure that does not discriminate in favor of existing service
providers, or otherwise limit the number of independent service
providers that are permitted to provide services to consumers.
Vigorous competition between a large number of service provid-
ers is believed to encourage investment in infrastructure, provi-
sion of new services, improvements in quality and availability of
lower prices. The World Trade Organization (WTO) founded
upon the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) is dedicated to lowering or removing trade barriers in
order to provide the open and competitive markets that the
global economy requires if it is to successfully meet the needs of
its six billion inhabitants. 141 Upon conclusion of the Uruguay
Round of trade talks in 1994 and the execution of the General
Agreement on Trade in services (GATS) under the auspices of
the WTO, participating states concluded that issues concerning,
inter alia, liberalization in the telecommunications sector, were
too sector-specific to be fully addressed by the general regula-
tory principles set forth in the GATS 1 44
In total, 116 nations participated in the Uruguay Round nego-
tiations concluded in December, 1993, achieving a new legal
framework for international trade in services that would be ad-
ministered by the newly created WTO, known as the GATS.' 45
The GATS agreement operates on three levels:
1. The main text contains general principles and obligations
that all members have to apply on issues concerning total
coverage of internationally traded services (Article I), the
Most Favoured Nation principle of non-discrimination
(Article II), national treatment (Article II), transparency
142 General Agreement on Trade in Services (1994), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/26-gats.doc (last visited March 31, 2005)
[hereinafter GATS].
143 Draft Final Report on ITU-D Question 17/1: Satellite Regulation in Developing
Countries, 18-23, ITU Document RGQ17/1/029-E (Sept. 4, 2003).
144 M.E. Davis, The WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services, 19 PAc.
TELECOMM. REv. 10-14 (1997).
145 GATS, supra note 142.
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(Article III), regulations (Article VI), international pay-
ments (ARTICLE XI), individual countries commitments
(Part III, Articles XVI, XVII and XVIII) and progressive
liberalization (Article XIX);
2. Annexes, dealing with rules for specific sectors; and
3. Individual countries specific commitments to provide ac-
cess to their markets. 46
The schedules of services are the means by which each WTO
member makes legally binding commitments on market access
(Article XVI) and national treatment (Article XVII).147 The
Schedules may contain additional commitments (Article XVIII)
that create an open-ended possibility to negotiate commitments
on measures affecting trade in services that are not captured by
market access and national treatment.148 Whether full or limited
access is granted, members may not take measures that reduce
the level of access inscribed in their schedules. 149 In addition to
the rules described above, participating states, concluding that
issues concerning, inter alia, liberalization in the telecommuni-
cations sector were too sector-specific to be fully addressed by
the general regulatory principles set forth in the GATS, went
ahead on February 15th of 1997, after negotiations representing
sixty-eight countries, to conclude an agreement on basic tele-
communications (BTA). This caused the regulatory disciplines
contained in the GATS and the Telecommunications Annex of
the GATS to become applicable to all telecommunications ser-
vices included in the WTO Members' schedules, plus further
broad regulatory principles unique to the BTA, embodied in a
document known as the "Reference Paper" intended to address
issues15 including: competition safeguards; interconnection;
universal service; transparency of licensing; independence of
regulators; and scarce resource allocation.1 5' At the close of
three-year negotiations in February 1997, the commitments of
sixty-nine governments (contained in fifty-five schedules) were
146 Tare Brisibe, Policy & Regulatory Developments in Asia-Pacific after the GMPS-
MoU and the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services: A Case for GMPCS System
Operators, 21 PAC. TELECOMM. REv. 31 (2000).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 32.
150 See Philip L. Spector, The World Trade Organization Agreement on Telecommuni-
cations, 32 INT'L LAW. 217 (1998).
151 Id.
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annexed to the Fourth Protocol of the GATS. 152 For satellite-
related communications, thirty-nine schedules (fifty-three gov-
ernments) committed on some or all types of mobile satellite
telecommunications services. In addition, ten governments
scheduled commitments on value-added telecommunications
services, which in some cases included satellite communica-
tions. 5 ' On February 5, 1998, the results of the WTO negotia-
tions on market access for basic telecommunications services
formally entered into force.154
The BTA, its associated reference paper and the WTO/GATS
are, when combined, of great significance to the circulation of
mobile satellite user terminals - including Aeronautical earth sta-
tions by which S-APC services can be offered - especially because
fifty-three governments 55 committed on some or all types of sat-
ellite based mobile service sector 'o,' described as an "other" cat-
egory in the GATS Services Sectoral Classification List, which
breaks down telecommunications into fourteen sub-sectors. It
can be deduced that the combined effect of the GATS and BTA
would enhance the ability for, inter alia, global mobile satellite
systems to surmount regulatory obstacles to the provision of tele-
communications services, including S-APC, on a global basis.
Dixon and McCorquodale, bearing the concept of sovereignty
in mind, have argued that the sovereignty of states could be con-
sidered to be under threat by the interaction and interdepen-
dence of the world economy and the resulting inability of
governments to give force to national policy objectives because
of the ratification of international economic agreements. 5 6 This
argument, based upon circumstances that have been examined
by other writers, 157 is based upon separate analysis 5 " drawing
upon the practices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
152 Highlights of the Basic Telecommunications Commitments and Exemption, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/serv-e/telecom-highlights-commit_
exempte.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Telecommunications
Highlights].
153 Id.
154 See Davis, supra note 144, at 10-14; Spector, supra note 160, at 217-22;
Brisibe, supra note 156, at 28.
155 Telecommunications Highlights, supra note 152.
156 DIXON & MCCORQUODALE, supra note 33, at 549.
157 P. A. Salin, Non- Trade Globalization Issues and Space Communications, 7
TELECOMM. & SPACEJ. 130, 130-58 (2001).
158 See WTO Appellate Board Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS1O/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 16 (November 11, 1996);
see also A. Orford Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions After
the Cold War, 38 MARv. INT'L L.J. 443, 464-67, 470 (1997).
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and the WTO, respectively, and concludes that both the ratifica-
tion of international economic agreements and the application
of these agreements by the international economic institutions
have placed significant limits on state sovereignty. 159
The argument presented by Dixon and McCorquodale can be
put to test by referring to the actual workings of the dispute res-
olution panel of the WTO. 160 In the year 2000, a request for
consultations was filed before the Dispute Settlement Body of
the WTO by the United States, in accordance with Article 4 of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes and Article XXIII of the GATS, regarding
Mexico's commitments and obligations under the GATS with re-
spect to basic and value-added telecommunications services. 6
The request for consultations stated inter alia that Mexico's
GATS commitments and obligations require Mexico to:
* Provide market access and national treatment for basic and
value-added telecommunications services (GATS Articles XVI
and XVII and Mexico's Schedule of Specific Commitments
annexed to the GATS);
* Maintain appropriate measures for the purpose of preventing
a major supplier of basic telecommunications services from
engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices, such as
anti-competitive cross-subsidization (Section 1 of the Refer-
ence Paper on Pro-Competitive Regulatory Principles (the
Reference Paper), which Mexico has inscribed in its Schedule
of Specific Commitments as "additional commitments" pursu-
ant to GATS Article XVIII);
" Ensure interconnection with a major supplier at any techni-
cally feasible point in the network; under non-discriminatory
terms, conditions and rates; in a timely fashion; and at cost-
oriented rates that are transparent, reasonable, and suffi-
ciently unbundled; and to provide recourse to an indepen-
dent domestic body to resolve interconnection disputes
within a reasonable period of time (Section 2 of the Refer-
ence Paper);
* Administer any universal service obligation in a transparent,
non-discriminatory, and competitively neutral manner that is
not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of univer-
159 DixoN & MCCORQUODALE, supra note 33, at 549.
160 World Trade Organization, Mexico - Measures Affecting Telecommunications
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sal service defined by Mexico (Section 3 of the Reference
Paper);
* Ensure that its regulatory body is not accountable to any sup-
plier of basic telecommunications services and that the regu-
lator's decisions and procedures are impartial with respect to
all market participants (Section 5 of the Reference Paper);
" Administer in a reasonable, objective, and impartial manner
its laws, rules, regulations, and other measures of general ap-
plication affecting trade in basic and value-added telecommu-
nications services (GATS Article VI:I); and
* Ensure access to and use of public telecommunications trans-
port networks and services on reasonable and non-discrimina-
tory terms and conditions for the supply of basic and value-
added telecommunications services and ensure that relevant
information on conditions affecting access to and use of pub-
lic telecommunications transport networks and services is
publicly available (GATS Annex on Telecommunications, Sec-
tions 4 and 5).162
The request filed by the United States alleged further that
since the entry into force of the GATS, the Government of Mex-
ico has adopted or maintained anti-competitive and discrimina-
tory regulatory measures, tolerated certain privately-established
market access barriers, and failed to take needed regulatory ac-
tion in Mexico's basic and value-added telecommunications sec-
tors. These acts and failures to act, in the opinion of the United
States, raised serious questions regarding whether Mexico was in
compliance with its GATS commitments in these sectors, stating
that Mexico:
" Enacted and maintained laws, regulations, rules, and other
measures that deny or limit market access, national treat-
ment, and additional commitments for service suppliers seek-
ing to provide basic and value-added telecommunications
services into and within Mexico;
* Failed to issue and enact regulations, permits, or other mea-
sures to ensure implementation of Mexico's market access,
national treatment, and additional commitments for service
suppliers seeking to provide basic and value-added telecom-
munications services into and within Mexico;
* Failed to enforce regulations and other measures to ensure
compliance with Mexico's market access, national treatment,
and additional commitments for service suppliers seeking to
provide basic and value-added telecommunications services
into and within Mexico;
162 Id.
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* Failed to regulate, control and prevent its major supplier,
Telffonos de Mdxico (Telmex), from engaging in activity that
denies or limits Mexico's market access, national treatment,
and additional commitments for service suppliers seeking to
provide basic and value-added telecommunications services
into and within Mexico; and
* Failed to administer measures of general application gov-
erning basic and value-added telecommunications services in
a reasonable, objective, and impartial manner, ensure that de-
cisions and procedures used by Mexico's telecommunications
regulator are impartial with respect to all market participants,
and ensure access to and use of public telecommunications
transport networks and services on reasonable and non-dis-
criminatory terms and conditions for the supply of basic and
value-added telecommunications services. 163
In light of the above, the United States considered that the
action and inaction described might be inconsistent with Mex-
ico's GATS commitments and obligations, including Articles VI,
XVI, and XVII; Mexico's additional commitments under Article
XVIII as set forth in the Reference Paper inscribed in Mexico's
Schedule of Specific Commitments, including Sections 1, 2, 3
and 5; and the GATS Annex on Telecommunications, including
Sections 4 and 5.164 By November, 2003, in what was regarded as
a key decision for United States long-distance telecommunica-
tions companies, the WTO issued a preliminary ruling regard-
ing price-setting for cross-border services. 165 Accordingly, the
WTO panel ruled that charges to United States telecommunica-
tions companies for the connection of long-distance calls to the
network of dominant domestic operator Telmex were artificially
high and not based on cost. 166 Telmex has the option to appeal
the decision. Subject to any appeals, Telmex must lower its in-
terconnection rates for United States carriers or face sanctions.
On a consequential note, the Mexican telecommunications reg-
ulator1 67 Cofetel is currently taking steps to amend the regula-
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 See DSB Adopts Panel Report on Mexican Measures Affecting Telecommu-
nications Services from United States, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
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tions pertaining to long-distance telecom services into and from
Mexico. 168
V. SOVEREIGNTY IN OUTER SPACE
In the preceding sections we examined the extent and effect
that the principle of state sovereignty plays within different activ-
ities and jurisdictions, pertaining to the provision of S-APC. Re-
alizing that S-APC constitutes a dynamic activity taking place
within the various legal and regulatory regimes in force, it re-
mains to be seen whether this pivotal sovereignty principle ap-
plies to outer space as well. In this respect, the relevant
international instrument that sheds light on the matter is the
Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the provisions of its Article II
thereto, which provides that "Outer Space, including the Moon
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropria-
tion by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or
by any other means." '169 If this declaration were literally inter-
preted, it would mean that states do not exercise sovereignty in
outer space. However, the spacecraft/satellite(s) located in
space orbit over which radiocommunications signals by which S-
APC services are offered remain subject to the jurisdictional
powers exercised by states albeit under separate provisions of
the Outer Space Treaty including, inter alia, Articles VI, VII, and
VIII.
In this respect, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 makes provi-
sion, in its Articles V 170 and VIP 71 respectively, for the responsi-
168 For an analysis of the impact of the WTO treaty and its consequences vis-a-
vis dispute settlement in international law, seeJohn H. Jackson, International Law
Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to comply or Option to "Buy Out",
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (2004); Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law
in the WTO: How far can We Go, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535 (2001).
169 See BLACKSTONE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS 119 (Malcolm D. Evans
ed. 2001).
170 "States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for na-
tional activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-gov-
ernmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in con-
formity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-
governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropri-
ate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space, includ-
ing the moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization,
responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the interna-
tional organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such
organization." Id. art. VI.
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bility and liability of states involved in space activities.
Specifically, Article VI imposes responsibility on state parties to
the treaty to ensure that any space activity carried out by govern-
ment agencies or non-governmental entities is performed safely
and in conformity with the Outer Space Treaty and existing reg-
ulations of that state. Space activities performed by non-govern-
mental entities are also subject to continual supervision by that
state party. Thus, where the provision of S-APC services are con-
ducted by private commercial entities, it would be the responsi-
bility of a state party to the treaty to ensure that any such activity
is performed in compliance with the provisions of the Outer
Space Treaty and, hence according to Article III, with interna-
tional law.' 72 In other words, before any space-segment activity
aimed at providing S-APC services can take place, the commer-
cial entity wishing to perform such operations would have to ful-
fill any Outer Space Treaty requirements as well as other
requirements established by the state sarty to the Outer Space
Treaty responsible for the activities of that commercial entity.
One writer173 recommends that amongst the most important
would be the receipt of prior authorization, also referred to as a
license or permit." 4
VI. CONCLUSION
Earlier on in this article, two pertinent issues were posed in
the context of providing S-APC services on-board aircraft over-
flying the airspace of states, as well as the airspace above the
open oceanic and polar regions, wherein the said states may or
may not exercise sovereign rights. The first was the extent to
which a state that is overflown can control certain activities
171 "Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of
an object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and
each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is interna-
tionally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or
juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air or in
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies." Id. art. VII.
172 "States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and
use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance
with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the inter-
est of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international
co-operation and understanding." Id. art. III.
173 See Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, Regulation of Space Salvage Operations: Possibilities
for the Future, 22J. SPACE L. 5(1994).
174 PAMELA L. MEREDITH & GEORGE S. ROBINSON, SPACELAW: A CASE STUDY FOR
THE PRACTITIONER: IMPLEMENTING A TELECOMMUNCATIONS SATELLITE BUSINESS
CONCEPT 42 (1992).
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onboard a foreign-registered aircraft within its territory and sec-
ondly, whether the right to overflight permits the use of facilities
for non-safety communications, with regards to the extent to
which a state that is overflown can control certain activities
onboard a foreign-registered aircraft within its territory. Note
that by the year 1990, there were only thirteen National Tele-
communications Regulatory Authorities (NTRA's).175 Since that
time, the number has roughly doubled every four to five
years.176 Today there are no less than 123 NTRAs. Even in the
most deregulated environment, the consequences of effective
enforcement remains self-evident: to give effect to those rules
deemed necessary to maintain order in the sector; to facilitate
stability, predictability, progress and investment; to deter wrong-
doing; and to maximize social and corporate welfare. Most
NTRA's derive their power to enforce regulation first and fore-
most from their domestic enabling legislation. 177 In other words,
the statutes by which states exercise their sovereign rights
through "particular rights" or 'Jurisaction.' ' 17 In addition to
conferring power to dispose of substantive matters,179 enabling
legislation generally empowers the regulatory authority to: (i)
inquire; (ii) collect information; (iii) investigate; (iv) determine
culpability, and (v) impose penalties."' In addition, some regu-
latory authorities place conditions for enforcement or even en-
forcement mechanisms themselves in the licenses they issue.'
175 See ITU, TRENDS IN TELECOMMUNICATION REFORM 2002 at 15. [hereinafter
ITU TRENDS]
176 Id.
177 An exception to this is Columbia, where the regulatory authority is not re-
sponsible for enforcement actions in the telecom sector. Rather, an entirely dif-
ferent government agency maintains this responsibility. See id. at 45.
178 BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 105; BIN CHENG (1), supra note 37, at 434-37.
179 For example, Article 8 of Morocco's Law 24-96, requires the ANRT to estab-
lish terms and conditions for interconnection and to establish the procedure for
submitting interconnection disputes. The ANRT also must establish the rules
governing the radio frequency spectrum. See Effective Regulation: Case Study - Mo-
rocco, ITU TRENDS, supra note 175, at 23.
180 ITU, REPORT OF THE RAPPORTEUR'S GROUP ON QUESTION 18/1 (March 18,
2003) [hereinafter ITU RAPPORTEUR'S GROUP].
181 In Egypt, for example, a system to receive and investigate complaints and
repair faults must be specified in a license. In Morocco, quality of service stan-
dards are included (and presumably enforced by the NTRA) as license condi-
tions. In others, e.g., Singapore and Brazil, quality of service standards are
adopted as regulations applicable to all service providers. Regulatory authorities
of the European Union member states must follow the relevant directives issued
by this supra-national body.
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Second only in importance to an NTRA's enabling act or stat-
ute are the day-to-day practices and procedures it employs to
implement its laws. In some cases, enforcement procedures or
certain of their components are specified in the enabling stat-
ute. 182 Some NTRA's have developed separate procedures for
industry violators and complaints by consumers/end users. 8
In either case, as many examples indicate, enforcement proce-
dures generally include: (i) providing notice of the alleged in-
fraction; (ii) providing an opportunity to respond; (iii) issuing
interim decisions or orders; and (iv) imposing sanctions. 8
Many NTRA's have the power to order operators to produce in-
dividual documents or records, and can enter an operator's
premises and seize those documents if operators do not comply.
Similarly, some regulators may conduct on-site tests in order to
determine an operator's compliance with type-approval, quality
of service or radio communication non-interference require-
ments. Because these are fairly intrusive powers, agency officials
may often require judicial warrants before they exercise their
search and seizure powers. In other countries, however, those
powers are granted by statute and may require no judicial pre-
clearance. 8 5
While such measures as described above may well suffice with
regards to certain telecommunication services provided over ter-
restrial based infrastructure. The matter assumes a fair degree of
complexity when one considers the inconsistencies surrounding
the use by passengers of communications facilities for non-safety
purposes, on-board aircraft relying upon space - based satellite
platforms and earth - based ground infrastructure, within legal
and regulatory regimes that govern: outer space; the oceans and
polar regions; international air transport; international satellite
telecommunications; trade aspects of international economics;
the state where the aircraft is certified and registered; the state
being flown over; and the state where the ground facilities may
have been established. The ability to regulate and enforce satel-
lite communications in this context does put the sovereignty
concept to test and without the ability to enforce laws, a national
regulatory regime can be truly rendered meaningless.
182 ITU RAPPORTEUR'S GROUP, supra note 180.
183 Id.
184 ITU TRENDS, supra note 175. Some NTRA's, e.g., Zimbabwe's POTRAZ, do
not have the authority to levy fines. This is carried out by the courts. See Contri-
bution of Zimbabwe to ITU-D Question 18/1 at 2 (Jan. 2, 2004).
185 Id. at 47.
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